Rethinking India’s Vote: Balancing Stability and Fair Representation
“Proportional representation is not suited to the form of government which this Constitution lays down….in the House where there is a Parliamentary system of government, you must necessarily have a party which is in majority and which is prepared to support the government. One of the disadvantages of proportional representation is the fragmentation of the legislature into a number of small groups. Proportional representation would not permit a stable government to remain in office, because Parliament would be so divided into so many small groups that every time anything happened which displeased certain groups in Parliament, they would, on that occasion, withdraw their support from the Government, with the result that the Government losing the support of certain groups and units, would fall to pieces. Our future government must do one thing, namely, it must maintain a stable government and maintain law and order.”
(Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly Debate on 4th January 1949)
Babasaheb Ambedkar and the Constituent Assembly ultimately determined that proportional representation (PR) would not be suitable for a parliamentary form of government. Their main concern was that it might lead to the fragmentation of the legislature into numerous small groups, potentially causing instability. Proportional representation encourages the formation of many small parties and alliances to form a government. In contrast, the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system tends to create a two-party system where a single large party is more likely to form a stable government.
However, in the case of India, we already have a multi-party system with many regional and national parties under FPTP.
Total Number of Political Parties (including national, state, and registered (unorganized) parties.)
Furthermore, current political developments show that factions of parties claim independent political identities. Even with FPTP, we encounter:
a) a large number of political parties, and
b) small factions with political identities that are represented in the house.
The same issues the Constituent Assembly was concerned about with PR—fragmentation and instability—are manifesting under FPTP as well.
The FPTP system, followed in Lok Sabha elections, is regarded as one of the simplest forms of electoral systems, where each voter has a single vote, and a candidate wins if they receive the highest number of votes in a constituency.
The system of proportional representation has many variants, one of the most common being the list system. In the list system, political parties present lists of candidates in advance, who are awarded seats in proportion to their party’s vote share, usually with some minimum prescribed thresholds.
Another variant, the method of the single transferable vote, is followed for elections to the Rajya Sabha. In this system, the electoral college, comprising of MPs and MLAs, rank candidates in order of preference. Their vote is allotted to their first preference, and if no one emerges with a majority, the least voted candidate is removed from consideration and the second choices of those who voted for him are taken into consideration. This process continues till a winner with a majority emerges.
During the drafting of the Constitution, various systems of proportional representation were considered, but the FPTP system was eventually adopted to avoid fragmented legislatures and to facilitate the formation of stable governments. In the years since, certain criticisms have consistently arisen regarding the working of the FPTP system, which has led to a re-evaluation of the merits of the proportional representation system. This section will look at the arguments advanced for and against the alteration of the electoral system in India.
The most significant advantage of the FPTP system is its uncomplicated nature. The FPTP is the simplest form of the plurality/majority system, using single-member districts and candidate-centered voting. 5 Moreover, the FPTP system allows voters to choose between people as well as parties, with voters having the opportunity to assess the performance of a candidate rather than having to accept a list of candidates presented by a party, as under the list system.
This system, however, is thought to result in an increase in election expenditure, since every candidate is required to reach out to the electors on an individual as well as a party basis.
The FPTP system has been the hallmark of stability in the electoral system of India. The Supreme Court in RC Poudyal v. Union of India had categorized the FPTP system as possessing ‘the merit of preponderance of decisiveness over representativeness’. The FPTP system presents the advantage of producing a majority government at a general election by being decisive, simple and familiar to the electorate. This, at least in theory, assures stable terms for the party in power, with the requisite numbers in the House to ensure implementation of its policies. This also means better accountability for decision-making in the Parliament, since this system makes it easier for voters to identify whom to vote or not vote for in future.
In practice, India has seen both stable majority and unstable coalition governments under the FPTP system, indicating that it is not this factor alone that assures the stability of the electoral system in India.
The principal criticism leveled against the FPTP system is that it leads to the exclusion of small or regional parties from the Parliament. There is commonly a discrepancy in the vote share and seat share in results, where votes given to smaller parties are ‘wasted’ since they do not gain a voice in the legislature. What this often translates into is that the FPTP system, which boasts of the fact that it provides a majoritarian (and hence more democratic) government, is itself not able to adequately uphold majoritarianism in a multi-party system, since the winning candidate wins only about 20-30% of the votes. For example, it can be seen from following figure, first two major parties are winning seats disproportionately higher than their votes. However others parties are able to win marginal seats compare to votes they capture.
Seat shares and Seat to Vote ratio of top ten political parties
Smaller parties, when they have a broad base across constituencies, rather than a concentrated following in a few constituencies, may fail to win even a single seat even if their vote share is significant.
This also means that slight changes in the vote share can cause dramatic changes in the number of parliamentary seats won, leading to an electorate characterized by decisive swings in one direction or the other. This issue becomes more serious when a party with a low vote share wins disproportionately higher seats and forms a government. Consequently, political power may concentrate in a party that does not adequately represent the electorate.
Source: Jadhav (2021)On the other hand, while representativeness of political parties is not ensured in the FPTP system, it does encourage political parties themselves to have more broad-based participation. Moreover, it ensures that there is a link between a constituency and its representative in the legislature, and incentivizes representatives to serve their constituents well. Further, smaller districts are more likely to comprise of common interests, and the small size also facilitates better delineation of these regional interests through increased movements at the grass-root level, which ensure that representatives interact more closely with the constituents, at least in theory. This might, however, not hold true for districts with large populations, such as Thane and Pune, which hold over 11 crore and 9 crore persons respectively.
Proportional representation undoubtedly falls second in competition with the FPTP system in terms of simplicity in voting, but it scores higher in terms of convenience during campaign. Candidates can simply focus pointed attention on defined groups to appeal to, and consequently, the problems of campaign financing do not feature as prominently in the process.
Because parties are granted seats in accordance with their vote share, numerous parties get seats in the legislature in the proportional representation system, without any party gaining a majority. This detracts from the stability of the system. Coalition government becomes inevitable, with challenges to such governments also becoming frequent. This is also why the Constituent Assembly decided that proportional representation would not be suited to the Parliamentary form of government that our Constitution lays down.
The advantages of proportional representation are visible in terms of representativeness. As opposed to the FPTP system, it allocates seats to parties in proportion to their vote share, and thus, in theory, no votes are wasted. For example, a party which secures 20% of the vote in the State would get 20% of the seats in the State. This also ensures that parties are driven to appeal to a broader cross-section of the population. In a country as diverse as India, this would mean greater encouragement for minorities to be politically represented.
The chances of regional or small parties gaining seats would also improve considerably, reducing political fragmentation in the country, and leading to improved regional and minority interests in the Parliament, and the enhancement of the political bargaining power of marginalized groups.
Recommendations of Past Reports
(i) ECI Report on the Fifth General Elections (1971-72)
The 1972 Election Commission report evaluated the proportional representation system and concluded it was unsuitable for India. The report noted that populous countries rarely use pure proportional representation due to its complexity and potential to increase political fragmentation and bureaucracy power.
(ii) Chief Election Commissioner Shakdher’s Proposal (1977)
Chief Election Commissioner SL Shakdher proposed a hybrid system where half the Lok Sabha seats would be filled by direct elections (FPTP) and the other half by proportional representation. The proposal lacked details on seat allocation and addressing disparities.
(iii) 170th Report of the Law Commission of India (1999)
The 170th Law Commission Report suggested combining the FPTP system with proportional representation. It recommended adding 136 seats to the Lok Sabha to be filled through proportional representation. To prevent the proliferation of small parties, it proposed a 5% vote threshold for representation. However, this could favor larger parties and complicate the system. The report suggested that such a hybrid system should be implemented alongside the existing FPTP system.
(iv) 255th Report of Law Commission of India (2015)
The 255th Report (2015) highlighted the merits and demerits of both proportional representation and FPTP. It suggested that any changes to India’s electoral system should follow a hybrid model, combining direct and indirect elections, which would necessitate increasing Lok Sabha seats. The report recommended the government examine the 170th Report's proposals for current feasibility.
In sum, the FPTP system has its merits of simplicity and stability, but lacks representativeness, while the proportional representation system, in contrast, promises increased representation but at the cost of stability and simplicity. Given that the stability of governments formed under the FPTP system in India has been varied, the arguments for switching to a system of proportional representation seem stronger, especially in light of the political diversity within the country. Further, the simplification of the proportional representation process and the limitation of its complexities have been demonstrated by various countries in Europe, and could be explored further for consideration in the Indian context. The Committee, therefore, suggests that a hybrid system, adopting the strengths of both the FPTP and proportional representation systems, may be explored, with a view to maximize both representativeness and stability.
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